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According to Plato in the Republic (Bk. VII. 527a.), the language of the mathe­
maticiam is ridiculous. They speak most laughably (µci>...a -yeXoU.Vc:), though they are 
quite unaware of the absurdity inherent in their speech. Nor does anyone else (Plato 
excepted) appear to have found in their language any notable source of uproarious 
mirth. Are we to say then that only some twisted sense of humor in the old meta­
physician can account for this idiosyncratic reaction? I shall try to explain what 
Plato found so funny in the mathematical language, and in a few fairly short steps 
we shall be drawn into some of the more perplexing questions in the philosophy of 
mathematics of our own day, thereby providing me with a suitable occasion to 
bring my thoughts on infinity up to date. 
Plato himself explains the absurdity of mathematical language in as straightfor­
ward a fashion as one could wish. Although the entire discipline (1T<W rd µd.611µa) 
is undertaken for the sake of cognition (-yvwaewc: €veKa) it is for the sake of some­
thing very different-action (1Tpa�ewc: fVfKa)-that all the actual words (1TaVTac: 
roix; Xa}'ovc:) of the mathematicians seem to be fashioned. For all their prattle 
( </>fJE"tyOµEvol) is of squaring and applying and adding, that sort of thing, as if they 
were engaged. in some kind of practical activity (W:; -yap 1Tparrovrec:) when in fact 
the science of geometry is the cognit�on of something unchanging, something that_ 
always is (rov aet'ovroc:). There is then a radical incongruity amounting to flagrant 
absurdity in an enterprise devoted to the sublime contemplation of the eternal ex· 
pressing itself in the vulgar, operational language of mechanics going about their 
work. From these remarks one might readily suppose that Plato is recommending a 
rational reconstruction of mathematical language, in order to bring it more nearly 
into line with its underlying intent. Not so. The mathematicians are not to be 
blamed for their ridiculous mode of speech: they are compelled (avavKai.Wc:) to 
speak in their coarse, inadequate way, doubtless because they are mere mathema­
ticians and not philosophers privileged to exercise dialectic on the highest level of 
the Divided Line. 
The distinction between theory and practice is familar enough, especially since 
Aristole in whom the dichotomy between theoretical and practical wisdom is firm­
ly entrenched. But if pure mathematics is obviously to be understood as high the­
ory, the actual words of the mathematicians Plato finds to be drawn rather from 
the jargon of practice, and it is the absurd conflation of the two-theory and prac­
tice-that strikes him as peculiarly droll. Owing to a radical transformation of math­
ematical language in modem times, the primary data which quite reduced Plato to 
the broadest of smiles if not positive guffaws (cf. Rep. 606 c) is no longer as readily 
available to us as it was in antiquity; and it will then be helpful to consult some 
actual pages of ancient mathematics if we are to succeed in representing to ourselves 
what Plato was getting at, with all the vividness that it deserves. Merely to cast one's 
eye over a page of twentieth century mathematics will not suffice. Quite the con­
trary. Plato's remarks will only seem mystifyingly opaque, they will have that thick 
wooliness thait gives philosophy a bad name when they should be relished for their 
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sharp bite. Let us then crack open our Euclid if not quite to the first page of his 
Elements where he lists the definitions required for the work of Bk.I then immedi­
ately after where he lists his five postulates. These should bring home to us with a 
shock of recognition the direct import of Plato's remarks. For of the five postulates 
it will be seen that all but one are shot through with the language of action. Euclid 
writes (in T.L. Heath's translation): 
Let the following be postulated: 
1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point. 
2. To produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line. 
3. To describe a circle with any center and distance. 
4. That all right angles are equal to one another. 
5. That, if a straight line failing on two straight lines makes the 
interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the 
two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side 
on which are the angles less than two right angles. (my italics). 
The first postulate may be taken as representative. It assures us that between any 
two points a straight line can be drawn. Here then is something which can be done, 
an operation that can be performed-presumably by the mathematician himself; 
and in consequence we are not surprised to learn that Proposition I of Bk. I reads, 
"On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle." But that is 
merely high-grade engineering from Plato's standpoint and altogether at odds with 
the true nature of geometry as a contemplative science. Even when Euclid, for the 
first time, in Proposition 4 of Bk. I undertakes to prove a purely theoretical theorem 
the means he employs are incongruously constructive. Thus one step of his proof 
reads: "If the triangle ABC be applied to the triangle DEF and if point A be placed 
on the point D, ... then the point B will also coincide with E ... ". Taken at face value, 
the whole notion that one mathematical point might be "placed on" another might 
well be felt to be wildly preposterous even if one is otherwise unsympathetic to 
Platonism, and one can scarcely be supposed to believe that it is literally in any 
one's power_ actually to draw a mathematical straight line, Euclid himself having de· 
fined a line as "breadthless length". 
That something pretty 'funny', i.e. peculiar, is going on in Euclid's language, can 
scarcely be denied; and once we have been alerted by Plato to the anomalous pres­
ence of the fourth postulate . among the others-it alone is suitably enshrined in the 
language o f  pure being (of what is eternally the case )-we are likely now to marvel 
at Plato's forbearance in being prepared to indulge Euclid in his absurdities where 
previously we were perhaps inclined to enjoy a smile of our own at the philoso­
pher's expense, for having the temerity to adopt a high-and-mighty attitude toward 
the mathematicians, very much de haut � bas. Indeed no one today will be more 
eager to side with Plato as against Euclid-if it came down to a crunch-than the 
modern mathematician himself who will be quick to draw our attention to the fol­
lowing two sentences: 
S1 Between any two points a straight line can be drawn. 
S2 Between any two points there exists a straight line. 
Although the two sentences may be said to be functionally equivalent from the 
standpoint of the working mathematician, it is of course the second which is char­
acteristic of modem mathematics in its official formulations, and it is here that the 
heart's desire of the old metaphysician can be seen to be amply fulfilled. Whether 
Plato can actually be credited with having succeeded in prodding the mathemati­
cians into mending their ways if only by some kind of remote control across the 
centuries, is a question that may be left to the historian to investigate. It is, how-
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ever, clear that while S1 is expressed in the language of becoming (to use Plato's 
idiom) 82 is austerely cast in the language of being, and if the one mode of speech 
is appropriate enough for practice the other is surely demanded by theory. 
At this point someone of an anti-metaphysical bent might perhaps be forgiven 
for choosing to sum up the narrowly 'factual' content of my remarks as follows. His­
torically, there are two languages of mathematics, the one constructive, the other 
non-constructive, where the former is characteristic of ancient as the latter is of 
modern mathematics. And h e  might even feel that there is no substantive difference 
between them, on the ground that one can translate back and forth from the one to 
the other without any essential loss of meaning. That this sentiment presupposes 
some unclarified notion of substance and essence of its own, I notice merely in pas;­
ing. More important for our purposes, there are two theses here that while (broadly 
speaking) true enough in their own way require serious correction. The first is his· 
tori cal, to the effect that the distinction between the constructive and non-con­
structive idioms in mathematics is roughly to be assigned to ancient and modern 
times respectively. The second may be stated cautiously as a symmetry thesis, to 
the effect that corresponding to each non-constructive statement in mathematics 
there is a constructive one and vice versa. The hiistorical thesis is soon seen to re­
quire emendation when one considers the following two statements. 
S3 Two sets have the same number of members if and only if they 
can be put in one-to-one correspondence with each other. 
S4 Two sets have the same number of members if and only if 
there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the mem­
bers of the one and the members of the other. 
Set theory being a peculiarly recent development, S3 and S4 are alike in being thor­
oughly up-to-date, and the constructive language of S 3 will be found to come trip­
ping off the tongue of the contemporary mathematician at least as readily as the 
non-constructive, platonistic idiom of 84. 
There remains, however, a striking difference in the mathematician's use of 83 
and S4. The former belongs to his shirt-sleeves language, to the informal idiom of 
the workshop, the latter to the dressed-up langua.ge of the printed page. When the 
mathematician is prepared to deposit his results in the archives of science it is of 
course the high dignity of tbe platonistic language of pure being that he will choose 
to affect. When he is engaged in the earlier, preliminary thinking through of his 
theorems he will often be found to lapse happily into the unbuttoned freedom of 
action language in his informal discussions with his colleagues. Thus the ancient 
idiom of Euclid may be said to reassert itself even in set theory, living a kind of un­
derground life that rarely surfaces on the printed page of canonical mathematics, 
and once again Plato seems to be vindicated when it comes to the more authorita· 
tive presentation of mathematical results. Only on one minor point would Plato 
seem to be decisively refuted: he was persuaded that some kind of necessity com­
pelled the mathematician to express his truths of pure being in the language of be­
coming. No such necessity would seem to be evident today if one is content with 
the official, dressed-up version of his science. But not everyone is content with that 
version, and in bringing out the deep sources of dissatisfaction we are brought into 
the thick of recent controversy. 
II. 
It is the question of infinity that forces us to examine afresh the double language 
of mathematics. For it can be shown that some of the farther reaches of the infinite 
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(if I may so express myself) can only be grasped by us-assuming again that this 
manual conceit of 'grasping' is not too absurd-by means of what are called non­
constructive methods in mathematics and that if one limits himself to the construc­
tive idioms he must relinquish many of the results that are characteristic of the sci­
ence in its standard, dressed up formulations. The symmetry thesis can thus be 
shown to be quite false. To mention but one example: in standard mathematics 
there are 'proved' to be sets (e.g., inaccessible sets of irrationals) which have the 
same number of members but of which it cannot be said that they can be put in 
one-to-one correspondence with each other. That there exists a one-to-one corres­
pondence between the members of those obscure sets, will of course be insisted up­
on in some high platonistic sense of 'exists'. One may indeed feel that such irreduc­
ibly non-constructive locutions that cannot be recast in the constructive idiom must 
somehow outrun our intuitions, being much too metaphysical to be accepted by 
anyone of a sober empiricist turn of mind. 
One may then retreat to what I have called the shirt-sleeves idiom of the mathe­
matician, characteristic of St and 83, and choose to dismiss what I have styled his 
dressed up language, displayed in S2 and 84, as being merely a stuffed shirt mode of 
expression. Thus one can blink one's eyes incredulously at the· notion that between 
any two points there exists a straight line. Is that really true? Does there exist a 
straight line connecting the center of the earth and that of the moon? Should we 
say at least that there is an imaginary line connecting them? But an imaginary line 
is no more a line than an imaginary cat is a cat. Well, you will perhaps say that in 
principle at least a very thin wire, as thin as you please, might be extended all the 
way from the earth's center to the moon's. So be it. But then you are in effect tak­
ing 81 to be more authentic and authoritative than S2. Indeed S2 then seems to be 
no more than a high-falutin, even pretentious way of asserting St. And one may feel 
in very much the same way in regard to 83 and 84. Is it really true in the case of any 
two equinumerous sets that there exists (where? in the mind of God?) a one-to-one 
correspondence between them? And again one may feel moved to posit an imagin­
ary line connecting each member with its assigned counterpart. It is then only a 
short step to insisting that the hard cash value of 84 is really to be found in 83. 
If these 9.1Wstions strike a responsive chord in your heart you may WEil be attiacted 
to a Kantian philosophy of mathematics. Kant was as impressed as Plato by the con­
structive idiom of classical mathematics but where Plato took it to be a deficiency, 
albeit an unavoidable one, Kant came to view it as the peculiar glory of science. It 
was what distinguished mathematics as a source of genuine cognition from meta­
physics which he felt was ultimately spurious. Although metaphysics and mathe­
matics were alike in one decisive respect-in being purely a priori, non-empirical 
discipline of the rational faculty-metaphysics was merely an empty game played 
with pure concepts that could generate no more than fairly trivial analytic proposi­
tions. It was precisely by means of constructions that the mathematician enjoyed a 
privileged position, enabling him to synthesize his concepts in the a priori medium 
of a construction-guided. intuition. And this constructive activity of mathematics 
is seen to be only a special if exalted case of the constructive activity of the !human 
mind as such in all its genuinely cognitive employments. The objective world then is 
itself constructed by us from the raw data of the senses, and the objects that re­
sult from our constructive conceptualizations are always theoretical entities that 
being invincibly mind-dependent must not be mistaken for real things in themselves. 
The two languages of mathematics are thus found to correspond to Kantian and 
Platonistic modes of thought respectively, the one being expressed in the construc­
tive idiom, the other being enshrined in the non-constructive formulas. And if only 
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the symmetry thesis were true the working mathematician at least could choose to 
stand above the battle, speaking the language of Kant in his everyday work clothes 
and that of Plato in his Sunday best. How the question of the infinite, which Kant 
not surprisingly takes to lie beyond the finite capacity of the human mind, should 
bring about the breakdown of the symmetry thesis, I wish to explain in some vivid 
detail. But it is not of course in mathematics that the puzzles connected with infin­
ity first arise. Perhaps the earliest encounter that anyone has with them occurs in 
context of what may be described as scarcely more than a joke that can hardly fail 
to delight even the dullest child in kindergarten. I am, however, almost embarrassed 
to mention it in adult company, as it may be felt to be much too childish, literally, 
for so sublime a theme. Begging your indulgence, then, the joke (if it is a joke) is 
simply this. Which came first, the chicken or the egg? What we have here, actually, 
is a high-grade paradox, and though the infinite as such is not mentioned it lurks 
powerfully in the background and generates the puzzle. For if one could somehow 
accept the infinite as being fully intelligible he could escape between the horns of 
the dilemma by acquiescing in what the mathematician calls a *w sequence, chicken 
being preceded by egg being preceded by chicken being preceded by egg, and so 
forth ad infinitum (represented thus: ... , e, c, e, c, e, c,). 
That any child should be expected to recoil in some kind of primitive, concep­
tual horror from such a prospect, is by no means implausible when one finds the 
foremost philosopher of our age recoiling in much the same way. In the recently 
published translation of his Philosophical Remarks dating back to 1930 Wittgen­
stein entertains the following conceit on p. 166. 
Let's imagine a man whose life goes back for an infinite time and 
who says to us: 'I'm just writing down the last digit of pi, and it's a 
3.' Every day of his life he has written down a digit, without ever 
having begun; he has ju�t finished. This seems utter nonsense, and a 
reductio ad absurdum of the concept of an infinite totality. 
No wonder, then, that the poor child should be stumped by his riddle. Like Witt­
genstein he rejects-better: he is encouraged to reject- the prospect of an infinite 
totality, but where is he now to turn in his puzzlement? For it is not merely the 
concept of an infinite totality that is being ruled out; tactily, the biblical account in 
Genesis is also being dismiss·ed, which would answer the riddle by assuring us that it 
is a chicken, directly created by God, that came first. Only the release provided by 
laughter remains to the child as a way out, and as he grows up, proceeding from 
youth on to old age, he will probably never realize that the highest point in his in­
tellectual development occurred at that moment, in his childhood, when he had his 
closest brush with the ultimate, and though he will doubtless regale his children and 
grandchildren with the familiar riddle he will be quite oblivious of the metaphysical 
import with which the occasion is charged. 
Natural science in the specific form of biology, physical cosmology, religion and 
mathematics are seen to be all involved, some overtly, others fairly covertly, in the 
child's riddle, and it is by no means clear that we in our sophistication are in any 
position to patronize him. Thus one may wonder how Wittgenstein himself having 
rejected infinite totalities would respond to the riddle. Would he agree that the 
physical universe must have come into existence at some finite time in the past? Al­
though he never discusses the question I think that we can safely say, simply as a 
point of scholarship, that he would hav�·been characteristically brusque in dismiss­
ing the suggestion. Like Kant before him, Wittgenstein was committed to holding 
that both alternatives had to be ruled out as pseudo-hypotheses, both the suggestion 
that the physical world has always been in existence throughout an infinite past as 
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well as the alternative that it had a beginning in time. That one or the other must 
certainly obtain, would seem to follow almost directly from the Law of the Exclud­
ed Middle but once one concludes with Kant that no possible experience could 
serve to verify (or even falsify) either hypothesis anyone of empiricist convii.ctions 
may well feel forced to suspend the rule of tertium non datur in the present case. 
That was Kant's policy in regard to all such metaphysical issues which (by defini­
tion) transcend the empirical, and it was Brouwer above all, steeped in his Kant, 
who in our own time ruthlessly applied this teaching to mathematics itself. 
Wittgenstein is said to have attended Brouwer's lectures in Vienna in 192,8, and 
the remark I have quoted certainly connects with Brouwer's thinking in the most 
intimate way. For Brouwer denied that logic entitles us to say that we know the 
following proposition to be true. 
S5 Either 7777 occurs in the decimal expansion of pi or it does 
not. 
In standard mathematics of course S5 is taken to be self-evidently true, and the 
working mathematician wrn have no qualms in using S5 as a premise in the proof of 
some theorem. But not Brouwer. Any such putative proof he takes to be fallacious, 
as resting on the metaphysical error of confusing a mere rule for generating digits as 
far as you please with some mind-independent entity consisting of the entire deci­
mal expansion of pi as an infinite totality. S5 is not indeed an exact parallel to the 
oosomological case, for here we can understand how tomorrow we might inspect t.he 
printout of an electronic computer that has been programmed to grind out the first 
billion digits in the decimal expansion of pi, only to discover (empirically) that the 
last four digits in the sequence were indeed all 7's. But this deficiency can be easily 
remedied if we consider 
S5 Either there is a terminal 7 in the decimal expansion of pi or 
there is not. 
In this case we know that merely grinding out digits as far as you please can never 
suffice to determine that there is, or is not, a 7 in pi beyond where there is no 
other. In the same way merely engaging in archaeological research into the increas­
ingly remote past will never enable us to determine that the world did, or did not, 
have a beginning in time. For in the one case though we might indeed come upon a 
terminal 7 in pi and in the other we might succeed in reconstructing a primordial 
event, in neither case would we know that we had in fact done so. And if we con­




There exists a terminal 7 in the decimal expansion of pi. 
A terminal 7 in pi is effectively constructible, i.e. identifiable 
by some finite procedure. 
According to standard mathematics and standard logic S7 might well be true even 
though Sg should be false. Even in the mind of God there might be no effective pro­
cedure for determining in a finite number of steps that some particular 7 in pi is in­
deed the last to be found, and yet that would in no way militate against the (platon­
istic) existence of such a 7. 
Brouwcr's refusal to countenance all such 'noumenal' entities took a very active 
form indeed in 1913 when as one of the editors of Mathematische Annalen he had 
the audacity to reject all papers submitted to the Annalen that relied on non-con­
structive idioms. In the high dudgeon the rest o:f the editorial board of the journal 
resigned in protest and then proceeded to re-elect themselves sans Brouwer. The 
Dutch government resenting this rebuff against their premier mathematician spon­
sored a new journal of which Brouwer would be in command. From this episode 
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one might easily suppose that Brouwer was a bit of a crank, though in his purely 
professional work there is irony in his being remembered today for at least one proof 
that is entirely non-constructive in character, his fixed point theorem in topology, 
that demonstrates the enormous attractiveness of the standard, platonistic ap­
proach. Among mathematicians of any philosophic turn of mind, however, his in­
sistence on constructive procedures has continued to exercise a fascination that re­
mains unabated at the present time, and there is widespread uneasiness regarding 
the so-called non-constructive sets. 
Plato indeed would laugh on hearing the contemporary mathematician describe 
all of the following sets as being constructible, for all the world as if their very ex­
istence depended on his action when if they exist at all it can only be as mind-inde­
pendent noumenal entities: Ko (the empty set), Ki (the set whose only member is 
Ko), K2 (the set whose only members are Ko and Ki), etc. ad infinitum; beyond all 
of which there is Kw (the set whose only members are Ko, Ki, K2, Ka, ... ). If this 
be the safe ground of construction it is (one might say) very much construction ex 
nihilo, and one may feel inclined to agree with Poincare' when he said early in the 
century, "Set theory is a disease from which mathematics will one day recover." 
The disease (iif it is a disease) is today very far advanced, and recovery is nowhere in 
sight. 
Beyond Kw there is in standard mathematics at least the first non-constructible 
set Kp which is the power set of Kw (the set whose members are all sub-sets of Kw). 
It can be shown that 'most' of the members of Kp are non-constructible. I am sure 
that it is Kp that must be kept especially in mind if we are to understand a fateful 
conversation that took place late in the last century between Dedekind and Cantor. 
Dedekind said that when he thought of a set he thought-primarily-of a bundle of 
unknown things. Cantor replied that in his case he thought of something rather dif­
ferent: an abyss. Such innocent sets as the set of Roman emperors whose members 
are fairly open to view, both mathematicians simply ignored. It was the obscure sets 
that drew their attention but notice how much more radical was Cantor's figure of 
speech. A bundle of unknown things can at least be opened; one can look inside. An 
abyss suggests a bottomless vista that can never be comprehended in one glance, and 
it is no accident that it was Cantor more than anyone else who ·envisioned the para­
dise of the non-constructib�e sets. "Paradise" is Hilbert's word. "No one," he said, 
"shall expel us from the paradise into which Cantor has led us," Brouwer doubtless 
being the spoiler uppermost in his mind. But even Hilbert was intimidated by Brou­
wer. Distinguishing between two types of statements in mathematics, real state­
ments and ideal statements, he conceded that all of the real statements were con­
structive in character and that they alone could be said to be strictly speaking true. 
Taken to be ideal in a fashion reminiscent of Kant, the non-constructive locutions 
had a merely architectonic function in rounding out the science of mathematics and 
according to it a systematic completeness that would otherwise be absent. Paradise so 
construed is scarcely more than a slum. 
III. 
My remarks up to this point having been merely descriptive of the war between 
Plato and Kant in mathematics, I want now to offe.r some suggestions of a more 
constructive kind (pun intended). Although I am convinced that Brouwer is radical­
ly mistaken in many respects, I remain to be persuaded that full-blown Cantorian 
set theory is finally tenable. The position I shall propose is intended as a halfway 
house between the two, Brouwer and Cantor, Kant and Plato, and it may be desig-
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nated as an infinitistic constructivism which accepts the intelligibility of the actual 
infinite, thereby rejecting the qualms of Kant and Brouwer on this score, but at the 
same time yields to their insistence that all mathematical locutions must be finally 
cashable in constructive terms, thereby declining to go all the way with Plato and 
Cantor. The lower reaches of the infinite which are closed to Brouwer shall be op­
ened up to us but the farther reaches where Cantor is entirely at home will remain 
tantalizingly beyond our grasp. 
We may begin by once more turning away from mathematics, in order to con­
sider the following proposition. 
89 Mt. Everest has always been in existence, throughout the infin­
ite past. 
89 is false. We know that it is false. But if we were to encounter some shepherd 
tending his flocks in the foothills of the mountain who took Sg to be true, owing 
perhaps to an ancestral kind of sacred awe, are there any purely conceptual consid­
erations that we might adduce to prove that he was mistaken? I do not believe that 
there are any such. Empirical considerations of the most massive, decisive sort 
drawn from geology, physics, etc. can indeed be mobilized in support of our own 
conviction but that is another matter. In fact they lead me to conclude (in the ab­
sence of countervailing considerations drawn from logic) that S9 is a perfectly ac­
ceptable empirical hypothesis which if not verifiable by any possible sensory evi· 
dence can certainly be falsified by it. But S9 logically entails 
S10 The physical universe has always been in existence, throughout 
the infinite past. 
Granted that 810 is neither empirically verifiable nor empirically falsifiable, it is 
simply incoherent to allow one's antimetaphysical prejudices to spurn S10 even 
while one accepts 89, however grudgingly, as empirically meaningful. For if it is in­
telligible to suppose that S9 might be true one has already-in effect-reconciled 
oneself to the intelligibility of S10. 
The case at hand is of the first importance. Kant believed that a cordon sanitaire 
might be thrown around the empirical realm, sealing it off effectively from the 
metaphysical. If only he had meditated on the child's puzzle I am sure that he 
would have seen how impossible was his program. Generalizing in the most approv­
ed scientific fashion from familiar barnyard evidence, the rural child at least infers 
that every chicken comes from a chicken egg and that every chicken egg comes 
from a chicken. These barnyard truths logically entail the Antithesis of Kant's First 
Antinomy regarding what he called "the cosmological ideas", namely that the 
world has always been in existence, for an infinite time. (One has only to add 
to them the equally innocent, certainly empirical premises that (1) there is 
at least one chicken and that (2) no chicken is hatched in less than a bit· 
lionth of a second.) If there is admittedly a certain extravagance attaching to 89 
there is surely none whatever when it comes to the barnyard truths, and it is pre­
cisely their everyday banality that renders the child's puzzle so philosophically pro­
found, in showing us what even Kant failed to grasp-that even barnyard empiricism 
(as we may style it) logically entails the metaphysical infinite. The child indeed is 
confronted with an antinomy of his own at least as deep as any in Kant. Empirical 
and conceptUJal considerations are found by him to be perplexingly at odds with 
one another, the former entailing, the latter resisting an infinite totality. 
How the Child's Antinomy is to be resolved, should now be evident. We must 
learn to recognize the intelligibility of a *w sequence of chicken and egg, and once 
we come to feel at ease with the actual infinite the philosophical consequences 
prove to be far-reaching indeed. Let me briefly touch on one standard topic, Hume's 
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celebrated problem of induction, in order to indicate how acceptance of the actual 
infinite can radically transform one's thinking in familiar territory, drawing on my 
paper "Induction and Infinity" in .RatiQ, December 1971. If it makes sense to sup· 
pose that a mountain might always have been in existence, the same must hold for 
a person. Assume now that there is some god who has always been in existence 
throughout the infinite past. Each and every day-past, present and future-the god 
asks the following question early in the evening, "Has the sun always risen every 
day throughout the infinite past?" And on any occasion when the answer to his 
question is yes the god appeals to the principle of induction and concludes, "There· 
fore the sun will rise tomorrow." According to the strict terms of my fable it is 
quite possible that the god is never given an opportunity to predict the sun's rising 
(e.g., if the sun never rises). But let us suppose that there is at least one occasion 
when he is afforded such an opportunity. It then follows that on infinitely many 
occasions he makes that same prediction. And of those infinitely many predictions 
that he makes it is logically impossible for more than one to be false: all the rest 
must be true. The principle of induction has thus been vindicated, if not for us, at 
least for any sempiternal being who can count on it as guaranteeing predictive sue· 
cess at a rate of infinity to one. 
There you have an example of infinitistic thinking but if you have never encoun· 
tered such thinking before, never at any rate sinc·e your abortive brush with it in 
connection with the Child's Antinomy, you must not expect to find yourself at 
home with it simply overnight. Infinitistic thinking requires a discipline very much 
of its own, and it can only be acquired with some practice. Which is not to say, 
however, that Us relevance to the war between Platonists and Kantians in mathe· 
matics is at all difficult to make out. One can be as nominalistic as you choose, re· 
flllsing to countenance mind-independent abstract entities of any sort, and still feel 
entirely at ease with infinitistic thin}Sing, thereby breaking at once with both Plato 
and Kant. In particular, one can welcome Wittgenstein's conceit of the person, 
doubtless a god, who only today has completed his enterprise, never begun, of writ· 
ing down the entire decimal expansion of pi, one digit per day. Far from taking the 
conceit as providing "a reductio ad absurdum of the concept of an infinite totality" 
you may prefer to join me in my essay Infinity (Oxford: 1964), p. 123 where I take 
it as showing precisely how acceptance of the actual infinite is by no means incom­
patible with a constructivist standpoint. Thus we are encouraged to re-examine the 
constrasting propositions S7 and Ss, which raised the prospect of a breakdown in 
the symmetry thesis, in the light of 
811 A terminal 7 in pi is infinitistically if not finitistically con­
structible; i.e., in principle identifiable by some infinitistic pro­
cedure. 
Having seen that S7 and Ss need not be logically equivalent, in that the former 
might (as far as we know) be true even though the latter be false, we can now insist, 
from the standpoint of an infinitistic constructivism, that 87 and S11 must have the 
same truth value: if either is true the other is true, if either is false the other is f:alse. 
T'he symmetry thesis is thus restored in the present case, seeing that corresponding 
to the platonistic idiom ·of S7 there is the constructivist locution of S 11. We have 
only to accept the intelligibility of the god reporting to us that in his infinite march 
through the decimal expansion of pi, back to front, he came upon a 7 for the first 
time on March 12 in the year 98,486,263 B.C. The god's report being true, there 
must then be (as we should put it) a last 7 in pi viewing it front to back. Alterna­
ti.vely, the god may report that prior to every 7 he encountered an earlier 7 that 
loomed into view. Assuming the god to have 'total recall', he must be in a position 
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to report to us either the one way or the other, and the Law of the Excluded Mid­
dle retains its full force. 
Infinitistic thinking may be conducted in terms of either the small or the large 
infinite. If it is the large infinite which is exploited in Wittgenstein's conceit the 
small infinite replaces it in a comparable fancy entertained (and also rejected) by 
Poincare'. Another great mathematician who agreed with Brouwer and Hilbert, Poin­
care' was their spokesman when he insisted that "there is no actual infinity", ex­
plaining that "when we speak of an infinite collection we understand a collection to 
whim we can add e�ments in,creasingly (similar to a subscription list which would never 
end, waiting for new subscribers)." 1 That Poincare' was mistaken I have no doubt. 
For on his view we should be entitled to assert-quite apart from all physical evi­
dence-that there are only finitely many stars in the universe and that it cannot pos­
sibly be the case that for every star, sn, there is another star, sn+l, which is twice as 
far away from us as sn. Any such armchair astronomy which feels free-in effect-to 
posit a last star in the universe on purely aprioristic grounds cannot be taken as sci­
entifically serious. 
All the less surprising, then, that Poincare' did entertain if only to reject the fol­
lowing procedure expressly designed to determine infinitistically that for every 7 in 
pi there is another 7 that lies beyond it. Write down the first digit of pi in 1/2 min­
ute, the second digit in the next 1/4 minute, the third digit in the next 1/8 minute, 
etc. ad inffnitum, with the result that after the full minute has elasped the entire 
decimal expansion of pi-3.141592653 ...  -will be laid out before you. Here we have 
an infinitistic construction, inspired by Zeno, which has been executed in accord­
ance with the small not the large infinite, but having entertained the fancy Poincare' 
was prepared as a pragmatist to "refuse to argue on the hypothesis of some infinite­
ly talkative divinity capable of thinking of an infinite number of words in a finite 
length of time."2 
More recently, however, it has been acknowledged by W. V. Quine, also a prag­
matist, that "having arrived at a view of expressions as finite sequences ...  the further 
step to infinite expressions is in no way audacious," though it would be "distinctly 
a departure from all writings on grammar and most writings on logic ... to invoke in­
finite expressions."3 If I have chosen to invoke them, albeit in a much more nomin­
alistic spirit than Quine has in mind, it has been solely to narrow the gap between 
Brouwer and Kant on the one hand and Cantor and Plato on the other. I say 'nar­
row the gap'', not 'close it'. For there remain platonistic theor,ems of great impor­
tance that even the conceits of Poincare' and Wittgenstein fail to translate into the 
constructive idiom. Thus the power set of the natural numbers, which is equivalent 
to the set Kp mentioned earlier, proves to be as non-constructible as it ever was by ordinary finitistic means. And the following theorem 
S12 There is a well-ordering of the real numbers which Zermelo 
proved on the basis of the desperately controversial because 
highly non-constructive Axiom of Choice, we are in no posi­
tion to reformulate as 
813 The real numbers can be well-ordered by some (denumerably) 
infinitistic procedure. 
Rather than conclude on a pessimistic note allow me to refer you to my paper 
"Continuity and the Theory of Measurement," Journal of Philosophy, July 18, 
1968 where an admittedly audacious-the word is doubtless required here-suges­
tion is offered for strengthening our present low-grade infinistic constructivism.-l If 
we can succeed in satisfying ourselves of the intelligibility of 
814 There is a non-zero interval of time, i, which for any arbitrary 
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rational number r is less than r minutes long. 
we shall have penetrated still deeper into the small infinite, laying bare the micro. 
domain of the actual infinitesimals. For the non-zero interval of time i will extend 
over less than a millionth of a minute, less also than a billionth of a minute, a tril· 
�ionth, etc. After being discredited in serious mathematics for almost a century, the 
actual infinitesimals have recently regained their respectability through the work of 
Abraham Robinson who has reconstituted the cakulus by their means. But Robin· 
son refused to take them with any metaphysical let alone physical seriousness, pre­
f erring to regard them as a purely formal device justified only by systematic con­
siderations. Let them, however, be accredited with full ontological import, and a 
way is thereby opened to us for understanding how the following may be trne. 
S 15 The real numbers can be well-ordered by some (nondenumer-
ably) infinitistic procedure. 
Ther� being allowed to be one, there must then be nondenumerably many infini­
tesimal intervals of time in a single minute which can then be used by a god to write 
down all of the real numbers: he may even succeed (if only by clhance) in imposing 
a well-ordering upon them. 
The Continuum Hypothesis itself-especially perplexing after Paul Cohen's p1roof 
that its truth or falsity cannot be resolved even in non-constructive set theory as we 
know it-may finally emerge as provable (or disprovable) by the powerful methods 
afforded by a high-grade, unrestricted infinitistic constructivism whose field of ac­
tion has been located in the domain of the actual infinitesimals of time. Finally, one 
may entertain the hope that in this way the symmetry thesis can be reinstated at 
last, with every platonistic theorem of Cantorian set theory finding its counterpart 
in the constructive idiom. 
lHenri Poincare; Mathematics and Science: Last Essays (New York: 1963), p. 47. 
21bid., p. 67. Cf. Charles Chihara, Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle 
(Ithaca: 1973), Ch. 4. 
3w.v. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs: 1970), p. 91. See also In· 
finitistic Methods, proceedings of a 1959 symposium (Warsaw, 1961). 
4Criticisms of my paper have been made by Henry Kyburg and Robert Coburn. 
See Henry Kyburg, "Measurement and Mathematics," Journal of Philosophy, Jan, 
uary 30, 1969, pp. 23-42 and Robert Coburn, "Identity and Spatio-temporal Con­
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